From their own experience, the Taliban are too decentralized and too diverse a group to control themselves usefully. During the Eid ceasefire, while the Taliban chanted their ability to demonstrate control of violence, innocent Afghan civilians were killed and wounded by hundreds of people. We could negotiate directly with the Taliban of the Quetta Shura or Peshawar Shura, and yet we would have field commanders who would make independent decisions without any „official“ discussions or agreements going on. Too often we treat this group as a homogeneous unit, although it is in fact a loose conglomerate of local tribal leadership, independent warlords, and separate or isolated cells. Any argument that the Taliban can control long-term violence is a fantasy. Al Qaeda, an international terrorist network, was granted a submarine in Afghanistan on the condition that it did not irritate the United States, but Osama bin Laden rejected the agreement in 1998 when he orchestrated bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa. The episode was indicative of the tensions that have on the day between the two groups. The Taliban were basically parochists, while Al Qaeda was targeting global jihad.  After the Kabul affair and the election of Pashtun tribal leader Hamid Karzai as interim national leader, the Taliban abandoned Kandahar following an offer of amnesty from Karzai. However, the United States rejected part of the amnesty that allowed the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, to „live with dignity“ in his native Kandahar.  The Taliban were not invited to the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, which led to the resurgence of the Taliban on the battlefield and the continuation of the conflict.
 This is due in part to the apparent defeat of the Taliban, but also to an American condition that the Taliban not be allowed to participate. In 2003, the Taliban showed signs of a return and soon after, their insurgency was underway. UN negotiator Lakhdar Brahimi acknowledged in 2006 that „our original sin“ was not to invite the Taliban to Bonn.  Insurgent attacks in the country quadrupled between 2002 and 2006.  At the end of 2007, despite the presence of 40,000 NATO-led ISAF forces, Afghanistan was „threatened“ to be under Taliban control.  Both the United States and the Taliban declared victory in the February 29 peace agreement. Here, Emrah Ozdemir (University of Karatekin, Turkey) explains the impact on the agreement, its impact on Afghan citizens and some potential obstacles to peacekeeping throughout the country. The result should be that this aspect of the agreement worked hard with the Ghani government, which should instead have been supported by the U.S. government in its decision, especially given the likelihood that these individuals would be on the front line in the days following their release. This is a critical error in the agreement and I was not surprised to learn that President Ashraf Ghani announced his refusal to release these prisoners within 24 hours of signing the agreement. If these prisoners were to be released, this should lead to a satisfactory conclusion to intra-Afghan talks, not as a precondition for Taliban talks with the Afghan government, let alone at the beginning of the talks.
President Trump said that „countries must take care of … We have been there for 20 years, and we have protected the country, but we cannot be there for the next one — one day they will have to protect themselves. This remark means that the economic and human costs of the campaign in Afghanistan have become extremely high for the Trump administration and the American people. Moreover, it is clear that all the efforts made by the country since 2001 have not reduced the political, economic and military power of the Taliban. Thus, the United States has an obligation to recognize the Taliban as influential players in the country.